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MANUFACTURING CONVICTIONS:
WHY DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE
DATA UNDERLYING FORENSIC DNA KITS
JENNIFER N. MELLON
INTRODUCTION
When forensic DNA testing arrived in the courtroom, it was her-
alded as the “greatest advance in crime fighting technology since fin-
gerprints.”1 From the beginning, however, nonforensic scientists and
defense lawyers expressed concern that enthusiasm for the new tech-
nology had outpaced forensic laboratory capabilities.2 This concern
arose from the fact that many labs were suffering from chronically
high error rates even before crime laboratories were asked to perform
the highly sophisticated analysis forensic DNA testing requires.3 To
Copyright © 2001 by Jennifer N. Mellon.
1. William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests:
Lessons from the “DNA War,” 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 22 (1993) (quoting People v.
Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Sup. Ct. 1988)).
2. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76
WASH. L. REV. 413, 413–14 (2001) (“[DNA’s] suitability for the courtroom was bitterly con-
tested. Significant questions were raised in the popular press, books from scientific publishers,
law reviews, and, of course, in trial and appellate courts.”).
3. JOSEPH L. PETERSON ET AL., CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING
RESEARCH PROGRAM 251 (1978) (providing the following error rates in state laboratories:
71.2% of laboratories erred in blood tests, 51.4% erred in matching paint samples, 35.5% erred
in soil examinations, and 28.2% erred in firearms identifications). The Peterson survey explored
only errors resulting from incompetence, not those “errors” resulting from analyst bias. The
most clear example of bias is Fred Zain, a former director of the Division of Public Safety’s se-
rology division at the West Virginia state police crime laboratory. Zain was found to have will-
fully lied about test results produced by the state lab for years. In re Investigation of the W. Va.
State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993). Analyst bias also has
been noted in the San Francisco Crime Lab. People v. Bokin, No. 168461, slip op. at 15 (Cal.
Super. Ct. May 5, 1999) (holding DNA evidence inadmissible), available at http://www.
scientific.org/distribution/archive/ca-v-bokin.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal). In its or-
der, the court noted that Alan Keel, then the head of the San Francisco Crime Lab, demon-
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find out if labs suffer from similar error rates while performing foren-
sic DNA analysis, defendants have sought extensive discovery of
testing data.4 The laboratories performing DNA testing have resisted
discovery.5
The discovery conflicts surrounding forensic DNA testing moved
into a new arena when state laboratories began using DNA kits pre-
fabricated by private corporations. Commercial forensic DNA kits
are like chemistry sets: they include all of the materials used in DNA
testing and detailed instructions on how to produce results.6 The kits
provide a protocol and ingredients, but the companies are generally
reluctant to reveal information unnecessary to the step-by-step testing
process.7 In fact, the companies provide so little information that
analysts using kits have been compared to “the average person using
a VCR—with no knowledge of the science that makes it work, but
happy to push a button and get results.”8
strated an unacceptable degree of bias toward the prosecution. Id. The court described Keel’s
declaration in opposition to defense discovery as “beyond advocacy—it indicated a critical atti-
tude toward the defense function in a criminal case.” Id.
4. E.g., United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629, 636 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (granting the defen-
dant’s discovery motion for materials relating to DNA analysis of blood); State v. Dykes, 847
P.2d 1214, 1217–19 (Kan. 1993) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s discovery motion for a
DNA database); People v. Davis, 601 N.Y.S.2d 174, 175 (App. Div. 1993) (granting a new trial
to the defendant on the basis of the trial court’s refusal of access to the data underlying a DNA
match); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 797 (Va. 1989) (asserting that the Com-
monwealth is not required to establish the reliability of incriminating DNA tests).
5. Thompson, supra note 1, at 96–100 (describing the efforts of prosecutors, the FBI, and
private forensic laboratories to resist defense discovery). The fight over access to data held by
the FBI grew particularly heated. Defense lawyers have accused John W. Hicks, the FBI’s As-
sistant Director in Charge of the Laboratory Division, of attempting to destroy data relating to
the FBI’s forensic DNA program to avoid the possibility of defense discovery. William C.
Thompson, Letter, Worthwhile DNA Questions, 77 JUDICATURE 57, 57 (1993).
6. For instance, the D1S80 kit, a PCR (Polymerase Chain Reaction)–based system mar-
keted by Perkin-Elmer Corporation includes preformulated D1S80 PCR Reaction mix, an alle-
lic ladder to be used in interpreting the results, and the allele frequencies from randomly se-
lected individuals (which are used to determine the significance of a match). Human Identity:
AmpliFLP™ D1S80 PCR Amplification Kit and Associated Products, Applied Biosystems, at
http://www.appliedbiosystems.com/fo/d1s80.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
7. See, e.g., Tom Abate, Company’s Trade Secrets Clash with a Judge’s Need to Know:
Court Wants Formula to DNA Test Kit but Perkin-Elmer Is Mum, S.F. CHRON, May 10, 1999, at
B1 (reporting that a San Francisco judge decided not to admit the results from a DNA test kit
because the company that manufactured the kit refused to reveal underlying data).
8. Doug Guthrie, Experts, Lawyers Differ on DNA Test’s Reliability, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, Sept. 6, 2000, at A13. Similarly, the kits have been described as a “shake ‘n’ bake opera-
tion.” Abate, supra note 7, at B1. Scientists have expressed concern that an analyst’s lack of ac-
MELLON.DOC 02/05/02 10:35 AM
2001] FORENSIC DNA KITS 1099
Thus, when defendants seek to discover information about a kit,
they must subpoena it from the private corporation that makes the
kit. Currently, the primary manufacturers of the kits are Promega9
and Perkin-Elmer Corporation (PE),10 successors in interest (at least
partly) to DNA typing products originally developed by the Cellmark
and Cetus corporations, respectively.11 Like forensic laboratories, PE
and Promega initially resisted defense efforts to obtain discovery of
data.12 Promega, however, eventually published the data that defen-
dants sought.13 PE, while making limited concessions in individual
cases, has continued to fight discovery in other cases.14
cess to more information will impact his ability to correctly perform testing. Eric S. Lander, In-
vited Editorial: Research on DNA Typing Catching Up with Courtroom Application, 48 AM. J.
HUM. GENETICS 819, 820 (1991) (questioning whether the forensic laboratories know enough
about the variability of their own procedures to devise appropriate quantitative criteria for a
match).
9. Promega is a life sciences corporation. It is headquartered in Madison, Wisconsin, and
reports annual sales in excess of $100 million. Press Release, Promega Corp., Promega Corpora-
tion Announces Plan to Significantly Support Admissibility of DNA Testing in U.S. Judicial
System (July 19, 2000), available at http://www.promega.com/pressrelease/00719dnatest.htm (on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
10. The Perkin-Elmer Corporation (PE) is a worldwide supplier of systems for life science
research and related applications. Press Release, Perkin-Elmer Corp., New DNA-Typing Sys-
tem Offers Powerful Technology for Determining Identity in Criminal and Accident Investiga-
tions (Feb. 11, 1998), available at http://www.pe-corp.com/press/prc5411.html (on file with the
Duke Law Journal). A 1999 survey of forensic labs in all fifty states found that seventy-five per-
cent of labs used PE test kits. Doug Guthrie, DNA Test Maker Will Reveal Formula at Hearing,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Sept. 1, 2000, at C1.
11. People v. Moevao, No. 168277, slip op. at 20 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 24, 2000) (granting
the plaintiff’s motion to admit DNA evidence), available at http://www.denverda.org/
legalResource/moevao.pdf (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
12. In State v. Pfenning, No. 57-4-96 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2000), the trial court excluded
the results of both PE and Promega kits because the kit makers had not released enough infor-
mation for the court to be sure of the kits’ reliability under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also State v. Dishmon, Nos. 99047345, 99069306, 99079650,
slip op. at 13 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2000) (noting that in resisting the defense subpoena, “PE
Biosystems claims trade secrets, overwhelming expense and effort[,] and[,] reading between the
lines[,] claims that the material is not needed here”).
13. Press Release, Promega Corp., supra note 9.
14. In People v. Cavin, No. 00-4395-NY (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 18, 2000), a Michigan trial
court case, PE agreed to reveal its primer sequences provided all parties involved agreed to a
protective order. Id., slip op. at 14 (admitting DNA evidence). In the same case, however, PE
refused to release its developmental validation data. Id. at 18. In many cases, PE has refused to
release either its primer sequences or its developmental validation data. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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In fighting discovery, both PE and Promega have advanced (and
PE continues to advance) various arguments.15 They have relied most
heavily on the argument that the information sought is proprietary
and thus protected under the trade secret privilege.16 Alternatively,
they have contended that defense subpoenas of data are invalid be-
cause the burden the corporations would suffer in gathering re-
quested information outweighs the defendant’s need for the informa-
tion.17
This Note argues that trial courts are wrong to admit the results
of forensic DNA testing when the defendant lacks access to the scien-
tific data supporting the testing method. Part I describes the types of
information being denied to defendants and how that information
could be used to challenge the kits’ reliability in court. Part II de-
scribes the current criminal discovery regime and explains how it fails
15. One Colorado trial court noted that “PE has resisted releasing its developmental data
claiming that the data was unavailable, that it had never been systematically recorded, that it
was scattered throughout various departments at the company and [that] its collection at this
time would be unduly burdensome.” People v. Shreck, No. 98CR2475, slip op. at 13 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. 2000) (granting the defendant’s motion to bar DNA evidence derived from multiplex kits),
available at http://www.scientific.org/distribution/archive/Shreck.doc (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). The Colorado Supreme Court later vacated the decision. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68,
81 (Colo. 2001). In at least two cases, trial courts have held kit results admissible even though
the kit maker refused to comply with a defense subpoena for data relating to the kit. The court
in Dishmon held that the denial of discovery was not significant to admissibility of the kit be-
cause (1) the State could make the required showing of admissibility of the results without the
discovery and (2) the defendant had access to other information and thus did not suffer any
prejudice that would violate his right to a fair trial. Dishmon, Nos. 99047345, 99069306,
99079650, slip op. at 15. As this Note argues, however, the Dishmon court makes questionable
assumptions as to the sufficiency of the evidence to which the defendant was given access. An-
other court found a subpoena unenforceable because the burden on the kit maker substantially
outweighed the alleged demonstrated need for the information. People v. Bertsch, No.
94F07295 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999).
The Dishmon court justified its holding as follows: “The system is like a Model A Ford.
Thousands of owners can tell us it works even if Henry Ford can’t or won’t explain it.” Dish-
mon, Nos. 99047345, 99069306, 99079650, slip op. at 15. A PE expert witness made a similar ob-
servation: “There are components in your car you don’t know anything about[.] Your concern
as a consumer is, ‘Does this get me from one place to another?’” Abate, supra note 7, at B1.
16. State v. Lynch, No. CR 98-11390, slip op. at 5 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 17, 1999) (“[I]t is
the position of the Perkin-Elmer Corporation to preserve their proprietary interest in the Pro-
filer/Cofiler testing kits.”); People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 116 (Ct. App. 2001) (“The Per-
kin-Elmer Corporation claimed that the [validation] data was proprietary.”); Abate, supra note
7, at B1. A seller of DNA kits for PE explained the corporation’s fears: “‘In one case where
[PE] turned over similar proprietary information to a court in Boston, a defense expert pub-
lished the data.’” Id. According to the seller, the publication allowed competitors to copy the kit
and undercut PE’s sales. Id.
17. Dishmon, Nos. 99047345, 99069306, 99079650, slip op. at 13.
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to create a right of access to data held by third parties, data that is
important in fully examining the reliability of forensic DNA kits. Part
III examines the arguments against granting defense discovery of the
data, and concludes that none of the arguments against expanded dis-
covery are persuasive. Finally, Part IV argues that the current hin-
drances to discovery are not only bad policy, but also constitutionally
defective. Although most courts to consider this question have not
found lack of discovery to have constitutional implications, discovery
of this data is crucial to protect defendants’ rights under the Compul-
sory Process, Confrontation, and Due Process Clauses.
I.  CHALLENGING THE RELIABILITY OF FORENSIC DNA KITS18
Criminal defendants have sought access to developmental valida-
tion data and primer sequences from DNA kit makers to effectively
challenge the results of DNA testing in court. The discussion in this
Part begins by describing in general terms the two ways in which a de-
fendant can challenge the reliability of scientific evidence: challenging
its admissibility at a pretrial admissibility hearing and challenging its
weight before the jury at trial. The discussion then moves to specifics,
describing the types of data that defendants are seeking from kit
makers and how that evidence would assist defendants in making
those challenges.
A. Admissibility
Under the law of evidence, trial courts must evaluate the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence.19 Although the required threshold
showing differs among jurisdictions at least formally,20 the underlying
concern of courts in all jurisdictions in evaluating the admissibility of
evidence is trustworthiness, also called “evidentiary reliability.”21
18. For my understanding of these issues, I am indebted to Michael Burt of the San Fran-
cisco Public Defender’s Office.
19. David L. Faigman et al., Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
(Draft Chapter of Forthcoming Second Edition of MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW
AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY), 78 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 33, 36 (2001).
20. Id. at 36–37.
21. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590–91 n.9 (1993).
MELLON.DOC 02/05/02 10:35 AM
1102 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:1097
There are two predominant tests used to determining the reliability of
scientific evidence: the Daubert22 test and the Frye23 test.
1. Daubert. In the 1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc.,24 the Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded the traditional standard for determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence.25 Under Rule 702, scientific evi-
dence is admissible only if it is shown to be reliable.26 The Court ex-
plained that evidence is reliable only where it is the product of sound
scientific methodology27 and announced a nonexclusive list of factors
by which a particular methodology may be evaluated.28 Those factors
are: (1) whether the underlying theory or technique can be and has
been tested, (2) whether the underlying theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the underlying theory’s
known or potential rate of error, and (4) the general acceptance of
the underlying theory in the scientific community.29 Thus, in Daubert
jurisdictions, trial judges clearly are expected to determine for them-
selves the reliability of evidence and exclude evidence found to be
unreliable.
At least one state trial court has held that DNA test results pro-
duced by Profiler Plus and PowerPlex kits are inadmissible on
grounds of unreliability under Daubert.30 The Pfenning court in Ver-
mont worried specifically about the fact that the manufacturers of the
DNA kits had failed to disclose to both the defense and the scientific
community at large the developmental validation studies and the
22. The Supreme Court has explained the Daubert test in three cases to date: Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141–58 (1999); General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142
(1997); and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589–98.
23. The Frye test is named after the case in which it was first articulated, Frye v. United
States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
24. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
25. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
26. Id. at 590.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 593–94.
29. Id.
30. State v. Pfenning, No. 57-4-96, slip op. at 68 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Apr. 26, 2000). It should be
noted that this was before the maker of PowerPlex, Promega, published its primer sequences
and validation data. In fact, Promega did so in direct response to the Pfenning decision. Press
Release, Promega Corp., supra note 9.
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primer sequences used to amplify the DNA before typing it.31 In dis-
cussing the refusal of kit makers to reveal information about the kits,
the court wrote:
[T]he failure of the manufacturers of DNA testing systems to dis-
close the primer sequences they have created to permit amplifica-
tion of DNA is problematic from the perspective of scientific knowl-
edge and, consequently, validation. It is more than problematic, it is
anti-scientific in that it inhibits the ability of scientists in the field
(including defense experts) to test the manufacturers’ claims. Al-
though the Court understands that the manufacturers believe they
need to maintain as confidential what they consider to be proprie-
tary information, in the case of new technology, it delays acceptance
by the courts.32
Other courts in Daubert jurisdictions have not agreed with the above
analysis and have instead held the results of DNA tests kits admissi-
ble despite the kit makers’ refusal to publish certain data.33 For exam-
ple, the Colorado Supreme Court recently held that results produced
by kits ought not even be subject to Daubert admissibility hearings
because they are merely applications of technology that has already
been accepted.34 However, as the Vermont decision makes clear, the
issue of the admissibility of the test results is not yet settled.
31. Pfenning, slip op. at 49, 52.
32. Id. at 49. In direct response to the decision in Pfenning, Promega decided to forgo its
trade secret privilege claim and reveal both its validation data and the sequences of the primers
included in its kits. Press Release, Promega Corp., supra note 9. In its release, Promega dis-
cussed the holding in Pfenning and its national repercussions. “Within weeks of the Vermont
decision, the issue gained momentum in Colorado, California, Florida, Nevada and Massachu-
setts. . . . Many other cases are expected as defense attorneys move rapidly to cite the Vermont
ruling.” Id. In response to the coming challenges, Promega chose to become “the first DNA test
manufacturer in the industry to make this unprecedented disclosure.” Id. As of the date of this
publication, PE has not followed Promega’s lead and continues to fight discovery.
33. E.g., People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 81 (Colo. 2001) (holding that the results of Profiler
Plus and Cofiler kits are admissible based on numerous studies, widespread information, popu-
lar use, and acceptance by other courts).
34. Id. (“Questions as to the reliability of the particular type of . . . kit go to the weight of
the evidence, rather than its admissibility.”).
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2. Frye. Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert, the
standard used by federal courts35 and most state courts36 in determin-
ing the admissibility of scientific evidence was the Frye test.37 Al-
though some states have chosen to adopt the new federal standard
announced in Daubert, many states, including California, Florida,
Michigan, and New York, have reaffirmed their allegiance to Frye.38
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals first articulated
the Frye standard: “While courts will go a long way in admitting ex-
pert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.”39 The theory behind Frye is that general ac-
ceptance of scientific methodology serves as a surrogate for its reli-
ability.40
Although Frye could be read to require that trial courts merely
confirm that a majority of the relevant scientific community’s mem-
bers supports the underlying principle at issue, many jurisdictions re-
quire a more substantive determination of reliability. For example, in
Florida trial courts must consider the “quality, as well as quantity, of
the evidence supporting or opposing a new scientific technique.”41 To
determine the quality of evidence, judges must make at least a limited
inquiry into its reliability. Furthermore, Daubert’s stricter standards
35. E.g., United States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“[Frye] has been
followed uniformly in this and other Circuits.”).
36. E.g., Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 368 (Md. 1978) (“This criterion of ‘general accep-
tance’ in the scientific community [the Frye test] has come to be the standard in almost all of the
courts in the country which have considered the question of the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence.”).
37. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
38. David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye, Again: The Past, Present, and Future of the General Ac-
ceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 386–87 (2001) (“Frye is . . . not only alive, but it is the plu-
rality rule in state courts, which are the venue for the vast majority of litigation.”).
39. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
40. E.g., State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1282 (Ariz. 1982) (“Frye . . .
[is] a general test of reliability.”); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) (affirming the
court’s adherence to the Frye test on the basis that courts should “not permit cases to be re-
solved on the basis of evidence for which a predicate of reliability has not been established”).
41. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997) (quoting People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321,
336 (Cal. 1994)). Similarly, when federal courts were still using Frye, the Sixth Circuit deemed
“general acceptance as being nearly synonymous with reliability.” United States v. Franks, 511
F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975).
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have caused many Frye jurisdictions to take the trial court’s gate-
keeper role more seriously, resulting in greater attention to indicia of
reliability traditionally outside Frye’s scope of inquiry.42
Like trial courts in Daubert jurisdictions, trial courts in Frye ju-
risdictions need not always hold an evidentiary hearing on the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence. Frye courts need do so only where the
scientific methodology underlying proffered evidence is novel.43 Sev-
eral courts have held that the evidence produced by DNA kits is not
novel because kits are merely tools for carrying out accepted meth-
odology.44 For example, in People v. Hill, a California appellate court
rejected the argument that each new test kit must, as a matter of law,
be subjected to a Frye hearing to determine its scientific reliability.45
Nonetheless, in most Frye jurisdictions courts have not yet decided
whether particular models of DNA kits require Frye hearings, so trial
courts are conducting hearings to avoid reversal. For example, in
Florida, the trial court in State v. Yisrael 46 conducted a Frye hearing
to determine the reliability of the Profiler Plus and Cofiler Kits.47
Similarly, in Michigan, the trial court in People v. Phillips48 held that a
Frye hearing was required because “[n]ew techniques applying gener-
ally accepted principles must themselves come to be generally ac-
cepted before their results may be received into evidence.”49
Although it is unclear if any jurisdictions will end up requiring
Frye hearings for particular models of DNA kits, it is clear that trial
courts in some jurisdictions are conducting such hearings. Further-
more, trial courts retain broad “latitude in deciding [how] to test an
42. Bernstein, supra note 38, at 393 (“[T]he stringent criteria established by the Daubert
trilogy have helped to cause a welcome expansion and tightening of the general acceptance test
in Frye jurisdictions.”).
43. E.g., People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244–45 (Cal. 1976) (explaining that a Frye hearing
must be conducted only where the proffered evidence is the result of a “new scientific tech-
nique”).
44. People v. Hill, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 110, 118 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Russell, 882 P.2d 747,
768 (Wash. 1994).
45. 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118. Courts in Minnesota also have held that no Frye hearing is re-
quired for particular kits where the underlying principles of the kits have been generally ac-
cepted. E.g., State v. Kirkendahl, No. 00044987, slip op. at 15 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 16, 2001)
(denying the defendant’s motion to suppress DNA evidence).
46. No. 99-20176CF10A (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 2000) (denying the defendant’s motion to
suppress DNA evidence).
47. Id., slip op. at 3.
48. No. 00-02025-FC (Mich. Cir. Ct. Oct. 20, 2000).
49. Id., slip op. at 6.
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expert’s reliability, and to decide whether or when special briefing or
other proceedings are needed to investigate reliability.”50 Where trial
courts choose to hold Frye hearings on particular models of DNA
kits, evidence of the kits’ reliability will determine their admissibility.
B. Weight
Even if courts decide not to hold hearings as to the admissibility
of DNA kit results, defendants still will have the opportunity to chal-
lenge the reliability of the evidence before the jury at trial. All evi-
dence related to reliability could be used by the defendant to chal-
lenge the weight given to the evidence by the jury, so long as the
evidence is admissible.51 In holding that no Daubert hearing was re-
quired for particular models of DNA kits, the Colorado Supreme
Court noted that all evidence bearing on the kits’ reliability should
“go to the weight of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.”52
C. Data Underlying Forensic DNA Kits and Kit Reliability
Before addressing the ways in which the reliability of the kits is
in question, it is important to note that many of the principles and
methodologies underlying forensic DNA testing are no longer in dis-
pute.53 Most importantly, all courts now accept the proposition that
the structure of an individual’s DNA is both constant and unique and
thus may be used to match biological evidence at a crime scene with
50. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
51. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Trial Judges—Gatekeepers or Usurpers? Can the Trial Judge
Critically Assess the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Without Invading the Jury’s Province to
Evaluate the Credibility and Weight of the Testimony?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 30 (2000) (“The
testimony submitted to the judge under Daubert because it is relevant to admissibility will also
be logically relevant to the weight of the testimony, if admitted.”).
52. People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68, 81 (Colo. 2001) (holding that the results of Profiler Plus
and Cofiler kits are admissible under Colo. R. Evid. 702).
53. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 2, at 414 (“Today, the controversy over the scientific
validity of forensic DNA testing has largely dissipated . . . .”). Basic introductions to genetics
and molecular biology may be found in many textbooks. E.g., I. EDWARD ALCAMO, DNA
TECHNOLOGY 21–39 (2d ed. 2001). In addition, the National Research Council has published
two volumes on forensic DNA technology and its legal implications. Both volumes contain short
explanations of genetics and DNA typing. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE 1–8 (1992) [hereinafter NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY]; NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 60–74 (1996) [hereinafter NRC,
EVALUATION].
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an individual.54 Courts also have accepted certain specific methods of
typing DNA, that is, characterizing a segment of DNA according to
either its sequence or length.55 DNA typing allows samples of DNA to
be compared, and thus allows analysts to determine that a suspect and
a biological sample share the same DNA profile.
The dominant methods of DNA typing now rely on Polymerase
Chain Reaction, or PCR, which has been almost unanimously
approved as an admissible methodology.56 PCR is an extraordinarily
powerful means of replicating a chosen segment of a DNA sample,
thus allowing more sophisticated tests to be performed.57 First,
the technician extracts DNA from cells, and, using heat instead
of enzymes, divides the strands from each other.58 The technician
then adds a primer, a short piece of DNA, to the single strands.59
The primer “marks” the section on the DNA molecule that will be
amplified.60 The enzyme polymerase is added to the primer-DNA
mixture.61 The polymerase, like naturally occurring enzymes that re-
sult in the DNA replication required to create new cells, creates
a new complementary strand to bond with each of the original
54. William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New
Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 61 (1989).
55. For example, the first generation DNA test relied on restriction fragment length poly-
morphisms (RFLP). 2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE § 18-3(A), at 10 (3d ed. 1999). The RFLP technique measures the length of certain
DNA segments in each sample. These DNA segments are a sequence of repetitious base pairs
called VNTRs (variable number of long tandem repeats). Id. The alleles of these loci differ in
the number of repeats and in the size of the loci as a whole. Id. VNTRs are not genes; that is,
they have not yet been determined to be associated with any traits. Id. § 18-3(A), at 11. This
makes them particularly suited for forensic testing because non-trait producing areas of gene
molecules are less likely to be influenced by natural selection, which leads to homogenization of
base-pair sequences within populations. NRC, EVALUATION, supra note 53, at 14. The more
common a base-pair sequence is, the less useful it is for forensic identification. Id. at 15.
56. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 2, at 458.
57. The PCR technique was first developed at the Cetus Corporation in 1985. George F.
Sensabaugh & Cecilia von Beroldingen, The Polymerase Chain Reaction: Application to the
Analysis of Biological Evidence, in FORENSIC DNA TECHNOLOGY 63, 63–64 (Mark A. Farley &
James J. Harrington eds., 1991). The scientist who developed it, Dr. Kary Mullis, won a Nobel
Prize for his work. For a more complete discussion of the PCR technique, see generally KARY
MULLIS, DANCING NAKED IN THE MIND FIELD (1998); PAUL RABINOW, MAKING PCR: A
STORY OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (1996).
58. Sensabaugh & von Beroldingen, supra note 57, at 64–66.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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strands.62 The process is repeated until large amounts of DNA are
created. After PCR, the DNA may be analyzed with both sequence-
based methods63 and length-based methods.64 Furthermore, PCR-
STR,65 the method used by PowerPlex, Profiler Plus, and Cofiler, and
promoted by the FBI as part of its Standardization Project, is also
being rapidly accepted by courts.
Even though courts have accepted the basic science underlying
forensic DNA testing, not all of them have accepted that commer-
cially produced forensic DNA testing kits are reliable.66 To effectively
challenge kits’ reliability, defendants need the following types of data.
1. Developmental Validation Studies. Developmental validation
determines the limitations of a new technology, such as what kinds of
errors a technology is prone to and what types of precautions must be
62. Id.
63. Sequence variant–based tests look at differences in the actual sequence of bases at a
specific location on the DNA strands. Id. at 66–67. Examples of sequence-based tests include
the dot blot and reverse dot blot procedures. NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 42.
To perform the dot blot method, the analyst adds a sequence-specific probe to dissociated
strands of PCR-produced DNA. Id. The probe hybridizes with the PCR-produced DNA only if
there is perfect complimentarity. The reverse dot blot method is quite similar; instead of adding
probes to the PCR-produced DNA, the PCR-based DNA is added to a nylon membrane con-
taining sequence-specific probes. Id. When the probe and the amplified DNA bind, the location
of the binding appears colored because of a chemical tag that is added to the DNA during the
amplification process. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, § 18-3(C), at 18. Support-
ers of the dot blot and reverse dot blot methods often argue that they are more straightforward
because they provide a yes or no answer on the question of the presence of a particular se-
quence, as opposed to a measurement of length. CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 48 (1990). How-
ever, interpretation of the results is highly dependent on the intensity of the color of the dot
produced. Id.
64. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, § 18-3(C), at 20.
65. PCR-STR first uses PCR to increase the amount of DNA available and then types the
DNA according to the length of short-tandem repeats (STR), areas of the DNA molecule in
which a single base pair is repeated over and over again. Short tandem repeats are, in effect,
very short VNTRs, which are described, supra, at note 55. PCR-STR allows the analyst to am-
plify multiple loci at once, in a technique called multiplexing. 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED,
supra note 55, § 18-3(C), at 21. It is the discriminatory power presented by multiplexing that led
the FBI to choose STR as the standard typing method of the national Offender Database In-
formation System (CODIS). Id. § 18-3(C), at 23.
66. Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 2, at 459 (“The newer technologies are gaining judi-
cial approval, but a court should not confer approval until it is satisfied that the specific technol-
ogy satisfies the applicable standard.”).
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taken to ensure that errors do not occur.67 Defendants seek access to
data produced in developmental validation studies to ensure, on the
most basic level, that developmental validation was in fact performed.
It is uncontroverted that developmental validation determines whe-
ther a given method or kit produces accurate, reliable results.68 As the
first National Research Council report on forensic DNA technology
noted, “[t]here is no scientific dispute about the validity of the general
principles underlying DNA typing . . . . However, a given DNA typing
method might or might not be scientifically appropriate for forensic
use.”69 As a result, the report recommends that any new DNA typing
method, or variation on an existing method, be rigorously tested
to determine its reliability.70 The report’s recommendation has
been seconded by both the Technical Working Group for DNA
Analysis Methods (TWGDAM)71 and the DNA Advisory Board
67. DNA Advisory Board Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Labo-
ratories, at Definition (ff), at http://www.cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/dabqas.htm (last visited
Jan. 4, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) [hereinafter Quality Assurance Standards]. It
is important to distinguish between developmental validation and internal validation. Internal
validation ensures that tests function appropriately in a specific laboratory; it does not seek to
discover all of the limits of a particular technology. Id. Several courts in addressing defense sub-
poenas for developmental validation have held that the information is not required because the
defendants already had access to internal validation studies. E.g., State v. Dishmon, Nos.
99047345, 99069306, 99079650, slip op. at 15 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2000) (holding that the de-
fense had no need for developmental validation data because the “BCA lab [the Minnesota
state crime lab] has validated the system as have other labs”).
68. State v. Pfenning, No. 57-4-96, slip op. at 49 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Apr. 6, 2000).
69. NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 51. The National Research Council re-
ports on forensic DNA are highly influential. The National Research Council is the research
arm of the National Academy of Sciences, which was established by President Lincoln as a body
that would assist the government in undertaking research on important and controversial scien-
tific issues. Id. at vi. The first report, DNA Technology in Forensic Science, was authored by a
committee of scientists in the fields of population and molecular genetics, forensic science, legal
academics, ethicists, and United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein. Id. at 173–176. The
report was peer reviewed by a group other than the authors, and the final report was written
and approved by the Committee as a whole. Id. at ii.
70. Id. at 72.
71. TWGDAM Guideline 4.1.2 states that “[v]alidation studies must have been conducted
by the DNA laboratory or scientific community prior to the adoption of a procedure by the
DNA laboratory.” Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Guidelines for a
Quality Assurance Program for DNA Analysis, CRIME LAB. DIG., Apr. 1995, at 21, 25 [hereinaf-
ter TWGDAM]. TWGDAM is a group of government and private forensic scientists that pub-
lishes its guidelines to ensure the “quality, integrity, and reliability of the DNA typing data and
its presentation through the implementation of a detailed quality assurance (QA) program.” Id.
at 22. According to the second report published by the National Research Council, The Evalua-
tion of Forensic DNA Evidence, these guidelines “define currently accepted practice.” NRC,
EVALUATION, supra note 53, at 24.
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(DAB).72 Furthermore, the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology has addressed STR systems like Profiler Plus, Cofiler, and
PowerPlex specifically: “Before a new STR system or STR multiplex
may be routinely employed in human identity testing it should be ex-
tensively validated to insure reliability of results.”73 Thus, discovery
could reveal that the required validation has not in fact been per-
formed.74
Even if discovery shows that the kits were appropriately devel-
opmentally validated, the data produced in that process could reveal
weaknesses of a particular kit model. For example, specific DNA tests
are associated with specific artifacts.75 Artifacts are byproducts of the
testing process that could be mistaken for evidence of a specific ge-
netic makeup.76 During developmental validation, the kit should be
“rigorously characterized with respect to the types of possible arti-
facts, the conditions under which they are likely to occur, the scien-
tific controls for detecting their occurrence, and the steps to be taken
when they occur.”77 The data produced by this study would thus help
72. DAB Standard 8.1 states: “The laboratory shall use validated methods and procedures
for forensic casework . . . . Novel forensic DNA methodologies shall undergo developmental
validation to ensure the accuracy, precision and reproducibility of the procedure.” Quality As-
surance Standards, supra note 67. DAB was established by the DNA Identification Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210301, 108 Stat. 1796, 2065, which established a federal framework for
setting national standards on quality assurance and proficiency testing. The framework involved
the creation of a DNA Advisory Board, whose members were to be appointed by the FBI from
a list of nominations made by the National Academy of Sciences and professional societies rep-
resenting the forensic community. NRC EVALUATION, supra note 53, at 24. The standards
DAB issued were approved by the Director of the FBI and took effect on October 1, 1998. See
Quality Assurance Standards, supra note 67.
73. John M. Butler & Dennis J. Reeder, Validation Studies on STR Systems, at http://www.
cstl.nist.gov/biotech/strbase/valid.htm (last visited on Jan. 2, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
74. Misrepresentation of in-house scientific studies by biotechnology corporations has oc-
curred in the past. A district court invalidated Roche’s patent on the AmpliTaq™ DNA poly-
merase enzyme after finding that Cetus and Roche lied about scientific studies they performed.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., No. C-93-1748, 1999 WL 1797330, at *28 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 7, 1999). “There is reason to be skeptical of entrusting any important regulatory matters to
a self-regulating organization . . . . There has been a notable dearth of published research in fo-
rensic DNA testing by scientists unconnected to the companies that market the tests.” NRC,
DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 162.
75. For example, RFLP testing is subject to such artifacts as band shifting, in which DNA
samples move at different speeds, resulting in shifted patterns that do not accurately reflect the
DNA sample’s genotype. NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 54.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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the defense recognize artifacts that the analyst may have misinter-
preted, know whether the laboratory used the proper controls to de-
tect the occurrence of artifacts, and understand whether the analyst
responded properly to signs that an artifact may have occurred.
The developmental validation data also would reveal the kit’s
ability to discern the results of environmental influences on the sam-
ple. According to TWGDAM guideline 4.1.5.6, developmental valida-
tion studies must include environmental studies, “so that the effects
of factors such as matrix, age, and degradative environment (tempera-
ture, humidity, UV) on a sample are considered.”78 The data pro-
duced by the developmental validation studies would reveal the kit’s
ability to distinguish between true results of the DNA analysis and re-
sults that reflect environmental degradation. 
2. Primer Sequences. The primer sequences are as material as
developmental validation to the defense’s case that the kits are unre-
liable. Primers are used in PCR, the amplification step of DNA test-
ing.79 DAB guideline 4.1.4 requires that “[t]he DNA primers . . . se-
lected for use in the forensic DNA analysis must be readily available
to the scientific community.”80 This is at least partly because the ex-
traordinary sensitivity of the PCR process makes it highly vulnerable
to contamination.81 As the National Research Council has made clear,
“[a]ny procedure that uses PCR is susceptible to error caused by con-
tamination leading to amplification of the wrong DNA.”82 Contami-
nation may occur from several sources, including handling in the field
during collection,83 cross-contamination of samples in the laboratory,84
and carryover contamination (the contamination of evidence samples
78. TWGDAM, supra note 71, at 26.
79. For a description of how PCR works, see supra notes 56–64 and accompanying text.
80. Quality Assurance Standards, supra note 67.
81. NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 65.
82. NRC, EVALUATION, supra note 53, at 71.
83. For instance, even dandruff contains DNA and may cause false results if somehow
mixed with the evidence. Miguel Lorente et al., Dandruff as a Potential Source of DNA in Fo-
rensic Casework, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 901, 901–02 (1998).
84. The New York City Medical Examiner Facilities have documented small amounts of
DNA on structural surfaces. Talya Toledano et al., An Assessment of DNA Contamination Risks
in New York City Medical Examiner Facilities, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 721, 721–24 (1997).
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or reaction solutions with PCR products from prior amplifications).85
Most relevant to the discovery rights at issue here, contamination
may be caused by the kits themselves. Because of the sensitivity of the
PCR process, the primers, which contain DNA, could contaminate
the results.86 Without knowing the sequence of the primers, neither
defense experts nor courts could determine if the effects of contami-
nation by the primer sequence are present in the results.87
Lastly, knowledge of the primer sequences would help to explain
a specific problem with the Profiler Plus kit that has arisen. In one
study of the vWA locus, PE’s Profiler Plus Kit and the Promega
PowerPlex Kit produced inconsistent genotyping.88 To understand
why the tests are producing different results, PE is sequencing the lo-
cus.89 Without access to the primer sequence used in the kit, defense
experts are unable to perform similar testing.
II.  THE CURRENT DISCOVERY REGIME
There is currently no nationally recognized right of access to the
data underlying DNA kits. In the federal system and in the vast ma-
jority of states, discovery is controlled by statutes or court rules.90 Al-
though the statutory schemes are similar in structure,91 they vary
85. NRC, DNA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 53, at 66 (“The most serious problem is con-
tamination of evidence samples and reactions solutions with PCR products from prior amplifica-
tions.”)
86. Paul Smaglik, Legal Protests Prompt DNA Primer Release, 406 NATURE 336, 336
(2000).
87. Id. Tom Mozer, a researcher working for Promega, contends that the chances of con-
tamination are extremely low. Id.
88. Margaret C. Kline et al., Nonamplification of a vWA Allele, 43 J. FORENSIC SCI. 250,
250 (1998) (discussing the inconsistency in National Institute of Standards and Technology re-
searcher documents, and indicating that PE “is aware of this problem and they are actively pur-
suing an explanation for this allelic dropout by sequencing the sample”); Sean Walsh, Com-
mentary on Kline, MC, Jenkins B, Rogers S, Non-Amplification of a vWA Allele, 43 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 1103, 1103 (1998). PE admits the problem exists and claims it is caused by a flanking se-
quence mutation. Id. “Our laboratory has observed flanking sequence mutations in several STR
loci, including vWA reported here, D16S539, and TPOX. Other laboratories have recently re-
ported flanking sequence mutations at D13S317 and D7S820.” Id. PE acknowledges that the
problem will continue, but claims that it can be avoided by using PE products exclusively. Id.
89. Kline et al., supra note 88, at 250.
90. 4 WALTER LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 830 (1999). The development of
the statutory scheme did not occur until fairly recently. As late as the 1970s, a number of states
still treated discovery as a common law subject. Id.
91. Id. at 830. The typical discovery statute or court rule lays out the following: (1) a proce-
dure by which the defense and prosecution can effectuate their discovery rights; (2) the items
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greatly in content.92 As a result, the status of discovery rights varies
among jurisdictions. Most of these rules are quite restrictive of dis-
covery in the criminal area.93 Discovery in criminal prosecutions tradi-
tionally has been extremely limited94 and remains far less robust than
discovery in civil proceedings.95
There are a few common provisions that could be read to sup-
port discovery of the data at issue here, but they have been applied in
a manner that limits their usefulness. Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 16(a)(1)(D)96 and almost all state discovery provisions man-
date the disclosure of scientific reports.97 Although the phrase “scien-
tific report” could be interpreted to include any information relied
upon, either explicitly or implicitly, in creating the final report, most
jurisdictions have not interpreted the rule in this way. In fact, some
states have specifically shielded from discovery “underlying docu-
mentation” used in preparing a final report.98 For example, the Ninth
that shall or may be disclosed by both sides; (3) the exemptions from disclosure based on either
content or some other characteristic; (4) the circumstances under which the trial court may issue
a protective order; (5) the continuing duty to disclose so that the items acquired after initial dis-
closure are automatically revealed to the other party; and (6) enforcement provisions. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckerman, Presumed Innocent? Restrictions on
Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1089, 1089
(1991).
94. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?
A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 4 (1990) (describing as bleak the criminal discovery
situation before Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and surmising that “the lack of access at
that time to materials essential to the testing of the government’s case and to the development
of the defense must surely have resulted in some unjust convictions”); Sarokin & Zuckerman,
supra note 93, at 1092 (noting that the existence of formal provisions for discovery in federal
criminal litigation is a relatively recent phenomenon).
95. Sarokin and Zuckerman have noted that
[i]t is an astonishing anomaly that in federal courts virtually unrestricted discovery is
granted in civil cases, whereas discovery is severely limited in criminal matters. In
other words, where money is involved, all parties receive all relevant information
from their adversaries upon request; but where individual liberty is at stake, such in-
formation can be either withheld by the prosecutor or parceled out at a time when it
produces the least benefit to the accused.
Sarokin & Zuckerman, supra note 93, at 1089.
96. Rule 16(a)(1)(D) grants the defense discovery of the “results or reports of physical or
mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D).
97. 4 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 90, at 860. Some states continue to make disclosure of
scientific reports discretionary. Id. at 861.
98. E.g., United States v. Iglesias, 881 F.2d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying discovery of
a chemist’s log notes); Roberts v. State, 396 S.E.2d 81, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (denying discov-
ery of an expert’s notes, work product, recordation of data, internal documents, or graphs).
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Circuit has made clear that log notes produced in the testing process
are not discoverable as scientific reports.99 Thus, Rule 16(a)(1)(D)
and its counterparts present an unsure avenue by which to pursue dis-
covery of this evidence.
The other discovery rule that could be read to allow for discov-
ery of the developmental validation data and primers is Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C). Rule 16(a)(1)(C) and the rules
patterned after it allow discovery of documents and objects “which
are material to the preparation of the defendant’s defense.”100 In ju-
risdictions in which documents are not discoverable as scientific re-
ports, courts have held that they still may be discoverable under Rule
16(a)(1)(C).101 For example, in United States v. Yee,102 the court, rely-
ing on Rule 16(a)(1)(C), held discoverable laboratory matching crite-
ria and standards, environmental insult tests, population data, and
proficiency testing data held by the FBI.103 However, the application
of Rule 16(a)(1)(C) is limited to those things within the government’s
control. It does not cover evidence held by third parties.104 Thus, as
long as the kit makers decline to share their information with the
crime labs using their kits, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) may not grant the de-
fense discovery.
There is currently no reliable scheme in place that provides for
the discovery of data underlying DNA kits.105 However, denying a de-
fendant access to this data may violate the Constitution. If the un-
derlying scientific data is not provided, and the evidence provided by
the kits is admitted, the defendant’s rights under the Compulsory
Process, Confrontation, and Due Process Clauses are violated.
99. Iglesias, 881 F.2d at 1524.
100. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(c).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Liquid Sugars, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 466, 470–75 (E.D. Cal. 1994)
(noting that even when log notes are not discoverable as scientific reports, they may be discov-
erable under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), which provides that the government shall, upon request, permit
the defendant “to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, [and] documents . . . which are
[in the government’s] possession . . . and [which are] material to the preparation of the defen-
dant’s defense”).
102. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
103. Id. at 636.
104. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980).
105. Compare the rules for criminal discovery with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4), which provides for far greater discovery of data underlying expert opinions. For a
criticism of the current restrictive discovery rules and a proposal for new, more expansive rules,
see Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. REV.
791, 821–25 (1991).
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III.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXPANDED CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
A. The Traditional Arguments Against Criminal Discovery
The traditional arguments against criminal discovery are prem-
ised on the idea that the Bill of Rights’s protections for the accused
skew the adversarial system in the defendant’s favor. The most suc-
cinct expression of this argument was made by Judge Hand:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not dis-
close the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question
or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addi-
tion he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, I have
never been able to see.106
Hand’s first contention, that the defendant need not disclose “the
barest outline of his defense,” has become less compelling as states
have moved toward allowing prosecutorial discovery. The expansion
of prosecutorial discovery gained momentum in the 1970s107 and cur-
rently a majority of states have discovery rules that provide the same
rights of discovery to the prosecution as to the defense.108 Hand’s sec-
ond argument against criminal discovery relates to the defendant’s
right to remain silent. Hand obviously considered the Fifth Amend-
ment a significant advantage to the defendant in the adversarial proc-
ess. However, as numerous commentators have pointed out, police
officers regularly obtain incriminating statements from criminal de-
fendants during pretrial interrogations, despite Miranda warnings.109
Another commonly raised argument against liberal criminal dis-
covery rests on the fear that criminal defendants will attempt either to
intimidate witnesses or obtain perjured testimony that contradicts the
106. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
107. Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74
CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1986).
108. Id. at 1579. For example, Michigan Court Rule 6.201 provides that both the prosecution
and the defense must disclose the names and addresses of lay and expert witnesses. Mark A.
Esqueda, Note, Michigan Strives to Balance the Adversarial Process and Seek the Truth with its
New Reciprocal Criminal Discovery Rule, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 317, 342 (1997).
109. E.g., Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 845, 859–60 (1995).
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prosecution’s case.110 Regardless of this argument’s merit in other con-
texts, its merit in the context of scientific evidence is certainly limited.
The significance of witness intimidation is reduced where a witness’s
testimony is reproducible. If one expert backs out, the evidence could
be tested anew by a braver soul.111 The possibility for perjury as to the
content of scientific evidence is equally limited; as the ABA has
noted, “it is virtually impossible for evidence or information of this
kind to be distorted or misused because of its advance disclosure.”112
B. The Trade Secret/Innovation Argument
A more compelling argument against liberal discovery of the sci-
entific basis of DNA kit testing rests on the possibility that forced dis-
closure could result in less, or slower, innovation in forensic sciences
in the future. The kit makers have implicitly relied on such a rationale
in arguing that the data sought is protected from discovery as a trade
secret.113 The trade secret privilege, like all intellectual property law, is
based in part on the premise that protection of property is required to
foster innovation.114 The trade secret privilege has been upheld in the
context of DNA kit testing by a trial court in Arizona,115 among oth-
ers.
The kit makers are certainly correct in emphasizing the role that
private innovation played in the development of forensic DNA tech-
110. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J. 1953) (denying the defendant access to his
own confession). Tune was later overruled by State v. Johnson, 145 A.2d 313 (N.J. 1958).
111. Giannelli, supra note 105, at 799.
112. 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 55, § 3-1, at 134 (citing A.B.A. PROJECT
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 66 (Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE]).
113. Abate, supra note 7, at B1; see also Defense Motion to Compel Third Party Discovery,
People v. Hunt, No. SA034500, at 8 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 1, 2000) (noting that PE invoked
the trade secret privilege in resisting a discovery request) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
114. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (articulating several policies
behind laws that prohibit the misappropriation of trade secrets, including “[t]he maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention”). The encouragement of
invention underlies not only trade secret law; it extends to justify all of intellectual property law.
For example, the Copyright Clause provides Congress the power to regulate appropriation of
“Writings and Discoveries” in order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
115. State v. Lynch, No. CR 98-11390, slip op. at 5 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 1999) (noting
that “[i]n a perfect world, one would suppose that every step, ingredient and method of manu-
facturing of devices, products, medicines and the like would be in the public domain”).
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nology. Lifecodes and Cellmark Laboratories, both private corpora-
tions, began forensic testing in 1987, a year before the FBI opened the
first publicly operated DNA typing lab.116 The first DNA evidence in-
troduced in court was the result of a Lifecodes Corporation test,117
and the first death penalty conviction involving DNA evidence was
achieved using DNA evidence produced by Cellmark Diagnostics.118
The FBI’s decision to open a DNA laboratory was based in part upon
the desire to reduce the role of corporations in forensic testing.119 De-
spite the opening of public laboratories, private corporations re-
mained central to innovation in forensic DNA technology.120 The
opening of public laboratories ensured that most actual analysis
would be conducted by public employees, but the equipment and kits
used by state laboratories continue to be produced by corporations.
Nevertheless, the appropriateness of applying the trade secret
privilege to kit makers is complicated by the fact that the privilege is
far more developed in civil litigation than it is in criminal law.121 The
discrepancy is best explained by the history of trade secret misappro-
priation law, which provides the forum in which parties are most
likely to claim a trade secret privilege. Until recently, trade secret law
provided a remedy for trade secret misappropriation only through
civil litigation.122
116. Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence
Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L. REV. 465, 471 nn.29–31 (1990).
117. Id. at 471 n.29. The Lifecodes testing method was also the first DNA typing method to
be approved by an appellate court. See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988) (finding that “scientific testimony indicates acceptance of the [Lifecodes] testing proce-
dures”).
118. Hoeffel, supra note 116, at 471 n.30.
119. Id. at 471 n.31.
120. The large part played by private corporations in forensic DNA testing is not unique to
the United States. The Council of Europe warns “against monopolies by certain biomedical
firms or police laboratories which at present seem to dominate the market.” COMM. OF
MINISTERS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., THE USE OF ANALYSIS OF DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID
(DNA) WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 33 (1993). The Cana-
dian police contract out analysis of DNA gathered at crime scenes. RCMP Hires Private Lab to
Test DNA After Criticism by Auditor General, CANADIAN PRESS, Jan. 3, 2001 (describing the
two-year, $2 million contract to Maxxam following an eight-month, worldwide search for a pri-
vate sector partner).
121. Kenneth Rosenblatt, Criminal Law and the Information Age: Protecting Trade Secrets
from Disclosure in Criminal Cases, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1991, at 15.
122. In fact, trade secret law was entirely common law until the emergence of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act in 1979. Susan V. Metcalfe, Comment, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Rem-
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In contrast, the boundaries of the trade secret privilege in crimi-
nal cases remain less clear, largely because the privilege rarely arises
in the criminal context.123 Although more than half of the states now
protect trade secrets through criminal statutes, state prosecutors
rarely use them.124 Nor has the Economic Espionage Act,125 the federal
criminal trade secret law, produced a barrage of cases; prosecutions
under the Act have been few because Attorney General Janet Reno
required that charges under the Act not be brought without her per-
sonal approval or the approval of her deputy until October 2001.126
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also provide limited guid-
ance, allowing only that: “Upon a sufficient showing the court may at
any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted,
or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate.”127
The role of the trade secret privilege in criminal cases has been
addressed by at least one state legislature. Under California evidence
law, the trade secret privilege does apply to criminal cases.128 How-
ever, the privilege is not absolute: “No evidence, however, shall be
excluded during a criminal proceeding pursuant to this section if it
edy Worse than the Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503, 506 (2000). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act
has been adopted by forty-four states and the District of Columbia. Id.
123. Rosenblatt, supra note 121, at 16 (“The poor fit between criminal law and trade secret
law has not been evident until recently . . . .”).
124. Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 235, 286
(1999) (explaining that federal legislation was enacted to “fill this gap in criminal prosecution”).
125. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Congress became motivated to inter-
vene in trade secret protection by claims that foreign governments had tried to appropriate in-
formation developed and controlled by United States companies. Joseph F. Savage et al., Trade
Secrets: Conflicting Views of the Economic Espionage Act, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2000, at 10. Con-
gress was further motivated by studies revealing that nearly $24 billion worth of corporate in-
tellectual property was stolen each year. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194 (3rd Cir. 1998).
It has been claimed that intellectual property theft, both foreign and domestic, cost American
companies over $300 billion in 1997. Carol Noonan & Jeffery Raskin, Intellectual Property
Crimes, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 971, 973 (2001).
126. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 194 n.4 (noting that only five prosecutions were publicly announced in
the first eighteen months following enactment of the Act). In the Hsu case, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned a lower court finding that the defendant’s constitutional right to
cross-examination and a fair trial would be violated were he not granted access to claimed trade
secrets. Id. at 197. Because the defendant was not charged with the completed crime of trade
secret misappropriation, but was instead charged with conspiracy and attempt to steal, the trade
secrets themselves were not material to the government’s case. Id. at 203. Instead, the govern-
ment needed only to prove that the defendant sought to acquire information that he believed
was a trade secret, regardless of whether the information actually qualified as such. Id.
127. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
128. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1061–1063 (West 1995).
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would conceal a fraud, work an injustice, or deprive the People or the
defendant of a fair trial.”129
Assuming for the moment that PE is correct in asserting that the
developmental data and primer sequences are trade secrets, a bal-
ancing of equities makes clear that the data should be revealed at
least to the defendant and his expert witnesses. Here, the denial of
access to the claimed trade secrets is highly prejudicial; in fact, it se-
verely infringes on the defendant’s constitutional rights.130 Moreover,
although it may be true that the dissemination of the information
could damage kit makers economically, it also must be noted that kit
makers are under a scientific obligation to release this information for
peer review. The TWGDAM guidelines state: “It is essential that the
results of the developmental validation studies be shared as soon as
possible with the scientific community through presentations at scien-
tific/professional meetings. It is imperative that details of these stud-
ies be available for peer review through timely publications in scien-
tific journals.”131
Lastly, protective orders are available to limit public access to
the information. Protective orders are, of course, unsatisfying to both
parties. PE and other kit makers fear that they will be violated.132 De-
fense lawyers argue that secrecy impedes understanding of the tests
and contravenes scientific principles of peer review.133 As one com-
mentator put it, “If scientific evidence is not yet ready for both scien-
tific scrutiny and public re-evaluation by others, it is not yet ready for
court.”134
In the end, the question becomes: Do we want to encourage
technological innovation at the expense of the constitutional rights of
defendants? As importantly, does forensic technology increase the
ability of the system to find truth where the evidence cannot be effec-
129. Id. § 1062(a).
130. See infra Part IV.
131. TWGDAM, supra note 71, at 26.
132. Companies may not want to risk exposure, based upon an instance in which protected
information was turned over by PE and later published by the defense’s expert witness. Abate,
supra note 7, at B1.
133. Thompson, supra note 1, at 100 (arguing that “[t]here is no excuse for secrecy con-
cerning the raw data” because “[a]ccording to long-standing and wise scientific tradition, the
data underlying an important scientific conclusion must be freely available, so that others can
evaluate the results and publish their own findings”).
134. Id.
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tively challenged by the defense? Even the most discerning forensic
technology will sometimes produce inaccurate results. If the accuracy
of forensic technology is not open to effective questioning, the tech-
nology will achieve convictions without ensuring justice.
C. The Argument that the Burden of Collecting the Information Is
Too Great
At least one trial court, People v. Bertsch & Hronis, has allowed
the prosecution to use PE kit results despite PE’s refusal to disclose
the underlying data because it believed that compliance with the de-
fendant’s subpoena would be unduly burdensome.135 The court agreed
with PE that “the burden on the third party . . . outweighs substan-
tially the alleged demonstrated need as set forth.”136 The court felt
that the defendant’s need was not substantial, and certainly did not
rise to the level of a constitutional defect, even though the defendant
had no access to the primer sequences and only partial access to de-
velopmental data.137 The court did not indicate how much develop-
mental data was provided.138
Not only did the court underestimate the burden that lack of ac-
cess would impose on the defendant,139 it also overestimated the bur-
den that production of the data would create for PE. The court said:
“it is a significant burden involving several people, four people over
several weeks.”140 While this may be true, PE should have anticipated
such a request and better organized its data. Even though PE has not
yet published its developmental data, the PE “Users Manual” that it
distributes with its kits promises peer review publication of the devel-
opmental data.141 Furthermore, both TWGDAM and DAB Guide-
lines call for publication of developmental validation. Practically
135. Reps.’ Daily Tr. of Proceedings, People v. Bertsch & Hronis, No. 94F07295, at 20,377
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1999).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 20,370.
138. Id.
139. I would argue that the defendant’s need was underestimated by the court; not only is
access to the data underlying the kits highly relevant for challenging their reliability, denial of
access to that data impinges upon the defendant’s constitutional rights, an argument explored
further in Part IV.
140. Bertsch & Hronis, Reps.’ Tr. at 20,376.
141. Defense Mot. to Compel Third Party Disc., People v. Hunt, No. SA034500, at 5 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed May 1, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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speaking, one must question the burden on an enormously wealthy
company like PE of hiring a few people for a few weeks to collect and
organize the data.
D. The Withdrawal from the Market Argument
In Michigan, where a panel of three district court judges recently
considered the admissibility of Profiler Plus test results, law enforce-
ment openly worried that a discovery order would lead PE and other
biotechnology companies to withdraw their products from the foren-
sic science market.142 Such fears are reinforced by the fact that foren-
sic testing kits and equipment account for only ten percent of the
sales of Applied Biosystems (the division of PE that markets forensic
DNA kits).143
There are indications, however, that law enforcement would re-
main a profitable market for PE. Although revelation of the primer
sequences and developmental validation data creates the opportunity
for labs to use PE technology without purchasing a kit, many labs will
continue to use kits because of the kits’ efficiency.144 It is possible to
create one or two primers by hand,145 but forensic scientists at over-
burdened labs appreciate the shortcut that pre-prepared primers pro-
vide.146
Even if the forensic market remains profitable, corporations may
prefer to abandon that market if revelation of the data would severely
harm their competitiveness in other life science industries. In the end,
however, the best indication of an industry’s ability to withstand
142. Guthrie, supra note 10, at C1. Although the withdrawal of DNA kit makers from the
market appears to be a price defense lawyers are willing to pay, the exculpatory possibilities of
DNA evidence ensure that the defense community also has an interest in the continued possi-
bility of DNA testing. On forensic DNA testing and exculpation, see Walter F. Rowe, Com-
mentary to EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL, at
xvii–xviii (1996) (noting twenty-eight cases in which DNA established innocence after trial).
143. Guthrie, supra note 10, at C1.
144. Id.
145. Smaglik, supra note 86, at 336.
146. For a description of the backlog at most DNA labs, see GREG W. STEADMAN, SURVEY
OF DNA CRIME LABORATORIES, 1998, at 1 (2000) (noting that at the end of 1997, sixty-nine
percent of DNA labs had a backlog of 6800 known and unknown subject cases and 287,000 con-
victed offender samples). The time saved by using DNA kits, or one DNA kit over another, is
extremely important to the labs that buy kits. See Doug Guthrie, DNA Testing Faces a Trial of
Its Own, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Aug. 31, 2000, at A1 (describing how the Michigan State Police
labs hoped to cut back on a persistent two-month backlog in cases by adopting new PE kits).
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revelation of proprietary information is provided by the industry it-
self. Promega, the other provider of STR multiplex kits, already has
indicated that it is willing to sacrifice secrecy for access to the forensic
market.147 If a particular corporation feels it cannot afford to reveal
the information, it seems highly likely that another will emerge to
take its place.
IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE LACK OF DISCOVERY
OF DEVELOPMENTAL VALIDATION DATA AND PRIMER SEQUENCES
The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]here is no general consti-
tutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”148 Unfortunately for the
clarity of the Court’s holdings on discovery and constitutionality, the
statement (1) fails to accurately describe the Court’s own holdings
under the Compulsory Process, Confrontation, and Due Process
Clauses; and (2) undercuts the values embodied in these three
clauses, particularly as those values relate to the reliability of scien-
tific evidence. Not only is there a constitutional right to discovery,
that constitutional right applies to the data that supposedly demon-
strates the scientific reliability of DNA evidence used against defen-
dants. The Constitution requires that test results not be admitted un-
less defendants are given access to the scientific data alleged to
establish the kits’ reliability.
A. Compulsory Process
To date, no trial or appellate court has considered whether ad-
mitting DNA evidence against a defendant who lacks access to the
data underlying the DNA testing kit violates the Compulsory Process
Clause. However, as the following discussion demonstrates, admitting
DNA evidence in these circumstances violates the dictates of the
Compulsory Process Clause and undercuts the values it represents.
The Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment estab-
lishes that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his fa-
vor.”149 At a minimum, compulsory process means “that criminal de-
147. Smaglik, supra note 86, at 336.
148. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Compulsory Process Clause is applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 17–19 (1967).
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fendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling
the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put be-
fore a jury evidence that might influence the determination of
guilt.”150 There are two issues here. First, to what degree, if any, does
the Compulsory Process Clause include a right of discovery? Second,
if such a discovery right exists, is it applicable to developmental vali-
dation and primer sequences held by private corporations?
The two cases that deal most directly with the rights of discovery
created by compulsory process are United States v. Nixon151 and
United States v. Burr.152 In Nixon, the Court unanimously upheld an
order requiring President Nixon to produce tapes of his personal con-
versations with the Watergate defendants. The defendants’ right of
discovery was grounded at least partly in the Compulsory Process
Clause: “The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial
similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment ex-
plicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right . . .
‘to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.’”153
The second significant case is United States v. Burr.154 Burr was on
trial for treason and sought discovery of a letter from General Wil-
kinson to President Jefferson. Burr wanted the letter because Presi-
dent Jefferson claimed to rely upon it when he announced to Con-
gress that he believed Burr to be guilty of treason.155 President
Jefferson’s main objection to the subpoena duces tecum was that it
arrived prematurely, before the grand jury indicted Burr.156 In reject-
ing this argument, Marshall explicitly relied upon the Compulsory
Process Clause as a source of pretrial discovery:
Upon immemorial usage, then, and upon what is deemed a sound
construction of the constitution and law of the land, the court is of
150. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (plurality opinion). For a detailed dis-
cussion of the limits of Confrontation Clause protections, see Peter Westen, Confrontation and
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 HARV. L. REV. 567,
567 (1978) (examining the parallels between compulsory process and confrontation).
151. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
152. 25 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14692D).
153. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711.
154. Although Burr emerged from a federal court in Virginia, and not the Supreme Court, it
was written by the future Chief Justice Marshall and has been cited in a later Supreme Court
opinion as “the first and most celebrated analysis” of the Compulsory Process Clause. Ritchie,
480 U.S. at 55.
155. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32.
156. Id.
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[the] opinion that any person charged with a crime in the courts of
the United States has a right, before as well as after indictment, to
the process of the court to compel the attendance of his witnesses.157
In holding the subpoena valid, Marshall also made clear that the
word “witnesses” includes written materials.158 He rejected any dis-
tinction between people and things under the Compulsory Process
Clause.159
The question remains whether the Compulsory Pro-
cess Clause creates a right of discovery applicable to the data
and developmental validation studies underlying DNA kits.
In United States v. Nixon, the Court explained that parties
in criminal trials who move for a subpoena duces tecum160
157. Id. at 33. The Compulsory Process Clause is not the only right for which the courts
have recognized pretrial implications. In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court
emphasized the importance of pretrial preparation, describing the time from arraignment
until the beginning of trial as perhaps the “most critical period of the proceedings against
these defendants.” Id. at 57. Because the defendants in Powell were without counsel during
the pretrial period defined by the Court, their Sixth Amendment right to counsel was ab-
rogated. Id.
158. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 34.
159. See id. at 35 (stating that the only difference between a subpoena and a subpoena duces
tecum was that a witness was required to bring a piece of paper). Although the 1987 case of
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie limits the reach of the Compulsory Process Clause, the restrictions an-
nounced do not apply to the type of discovery at issue here: discovery of data held by a third
party. In Ritchie, the Court noted that it had “never squarely held that the Compulsory Process
Clause guarantees the right to discover the identity of witnesses, or to require the government to
produce exculpatory evidence.” 480 U.S. at 56. However, the Compulsory Process Clause may
still be used to subpoena information from parties that are not governmental. Even the Court’s
announcement that the Compulsory Process Clause does not apply to information held by the
government or to witnesses’ names is of less-than-stellar precedential value. First, the opinion
was decided by a plurality, not a majority. Second, the Court neglected to apply its new rule to
the facts of the case, choosing instead to decide the case on other grounds. Id. (“Because the
applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Four-
teenth Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear
framework for review, we adopt a due process analysis for purposes of this case.”). Indeed, it
has been noted that the Compulsory Process Clause is uniquely able to provide for discovery of
information not produced by government investigation. Montoya, supra note 109, at 875 (sug-
gesting that the Compulsory Process Clause appropriately governs a defendant’s access to raw
evidence, whereas the Due Process Clause ought to govern a defendant’s access to information
produced by the government’s factfinding efforts).
160. The federal standard for a subpoena duces tecum is set out in Rule 17(c), which reads:
A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the
books, papers, documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion
made promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreason-
able or oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial or
prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their produc-
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“must clear three hurdles: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3) speci-
ficity.”161
Here, the information is undoubtedly relevant. The prosecution,
through expert testimony, will want to show that the kits provide reli-
able and accurate information, and defendants will want to show,
through the developmental validation study and primers, that the kits
either are not generally reliable or failed to provide reliable informa-
tion in a particular case.162
Next, the movant must show that evidence of the developmental
validity study and primers is admissible. This information is almost
certainly admissible during a pretrial hearing to determine the admis-
sibility of DNA evidence. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), a
judge’s admission of foundational or preliminary facts is not bound by
rules of evidence except with respect to privileges.163 Courts have uni-
formly held this rule to override the general applicability to prelimi-
nary facts of exclusionary rules such as hearsay.164 The admissibility of
tion permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof to be in-
spected by the parties and their attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
161. 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974). This was the court’s summation of a more detailed listing of
requirements, which demands
(1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are not otherwise
procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3) that the
party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in ad-
vance of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to
delay the trial; and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended
as a general “fishing expedition.”
Id. at 699–700.
162. For an explanation of the relevance of developmental data and primer sequences to the
reliability of DNA kits specifically, see supra notes 67–89 and accompanying text. For an expla-
nation of the relevance of validity studies to scientific techniques generally, see Edward J. Im-
winkelried, Coming to Grips with Scientific Research in Daubert’s “Brave New World”: The
Courts’ Need to Appreciate the Evidentiary Differences Between Validity and Proficiency Studies,
61 BROOK. L. REV. 1247, 1257–60 (1995). Professor Imwinkelried explains that scientific wit-
nesses testify using a syllogism. Their major premise relates to the probative value of the tech-
nology. Id. at 1257. For example, an expert’s testimony may be that when the DNA fragments
on two autoradiograms are of the same length and in the same position, the match indicates that
the fragments may come from the same source, or at least share genetic markers. Id. The minor
premise will be that the similarity of the two autoradiograms in the case at hand show that the
DNA samples tested may come from the same source. Id. A validity study is relevant to the
major premise in that the study would show whether the autoradiograms actually indicate a pos-
sible “match.” Id. at 1258.
163. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
164. Imwinkelried, supra note 162, at 1260.
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validity studies at trial is not quite as clear-cut,165 but the great proba-
tive value of this evidence makes it likely that courts will find it ad-
missible. The most important use of this evidence may very well be
during the pretrial hearing, where the evidence will be used to deter-
mine whether the jury ever even hears the results of scientific test-
ing.166 Its admissibility before trial surely satisfies the requirements of
Nixon, which interprets the Compulsory Process Clause to be con-
cerned primarily with the effective functioning of the adversarial sys-
tem.
The third requirement relates to the specificity of the request.
The request for discovery of developmental validation and primer se-
quences is highly specific. Despite PE’s protestations to the contrary,
the data is both discrete and of a type regularly produced during a
kit’s validation.167
Lastly, an understanding of the Compulsory Process Clause that
mandates disclosure of the data makes sense in light of the policy
goals identified in cases interpreting the clause. The Supreme Court
has written that “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to
present a defense . . . to the jury so it may decide where the truth
lies.”168 Here the Court identified two interrelated themes in Compul-
sory Process Clause jurisprudence: adversariness and truth seeking.
Increased access to the data underlying DNA kits serves both those
goals. It enables defendants to challenge the evidence against them,
and it enables the court to understand better the value of DNA evi-
dence.
165. Id. at 1260–67. Imwinkelried argues that a rigid application of the hearsay doctrine
might prevent the admissibility of a validity study in Daubert jurisdictions. Id. at 1265. However,
he also notes that no court has ever accepted this argument and that there are strong policy ob-
jections to doing so. Id. at 1283–84.
166. In both Frye and Daubert jurisdictions, reliability, which validity studies demonstrate, is
used to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. See supra notes 19–50, 67–78 and ac-
companying text.
167. DAB guideline 4.1.5.2 requires that developmental validation studies be shared as soon
as possible with the scientific community. Quality Assurance Standards, supra note 67. Guide-
line 4.1.4 requires the same of the primers. Id. The ability to share the information with the sci-
entific community surely translates into the ability to share the information with the courts.
168. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
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B. Confrontation Clause
Like the Compulsory Process Clause, the Confrontation Clause
has been noticeably absent from any discussion of the discoverability
of kit data. Even though this absence is perhaps more understand-
able, because the Supreme Court recently has limited sharply the
Clause’s application to pretrial discovery, there is a plausible argu-
ment that even under the Court’s narrowed understanding of the
Confrontation Clause, the conflict at issue here constitutes an in-
fringement of defendants’ Confrontation Clause rights. Furthermore,
the values embodied by the Confrontation Clause are as much at risk
in denial of discovery as are the values embodied in the Compulsory
Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has not been generous to criminal defen-
dants in interpreting the mandates of the Confrontation Clause.
Whereas the Compulsory Process Clause has been read to include
pretrial discovery rights, the Court has described the Confrontation
Clause as follows:
The opinions of this Court show that the right of confrontation is a
trial right, designed to prevent improper restrictions on the types of
questions that defense counsel may ask during cross examination.
The ability to question adverse witnesses, however, does not include
the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all informa-
tion that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony.169
In so holding, the Ritchie Court’s plurality opinion made clear that
the Confrontation Clause is “normally” satisfied so long as “defense
counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses.”170
The above formulation of the Confrontation Clause raises the
question of which cases are “normal.” As Justice Blackmun noted in
his concurrence, the plurality’s decision to divorce Confrontation
Clause rights from discovery rights amounts to a dismissal of any in-
quiry into “the effectiveness of the cross-examination” and renders
confrontation rights, at least in some cases, an “empty formality.”171
The plurality’s understanding of the Confrontation Clause creates the
169. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
170. Id. at 53.
171. Id. at 62 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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greatest obstacle to effective cross-examination of expert witnesses.172
The complexity of many types of expert testimony, such as testimony
on DNA testing, makes pretrial preparation imperative to effective
cross-examination.173 Forensic scientists agree. According to Douglas
Lucas, director of the Canadian Centre for Forensic Sciences, “‘If
cross-examination is to be the only way to discover misleading or in-
adequate testimony by forensic scientists, then too much is being ex-
pected from it.’”174 The extreme difficulty of effectively cross-
examining an expert witness without pretrial preparation and discov-
ery raises the issue of whether cross-examination of experts raises
“normal” Confrontation Clause issues within the meaning of the Rit-
chie Court’s plurality opinion.
Also, refusing defendants access to the scientific bases of evi-
dence used against them contravenes fundamental Confrontation
Clause values. The Confrontation Clause values with which the Su-
preme Court most consistently has concerned itself are the reliability
of the evidence presented and the jury’s ability to evaluate the
strength of that evidence.175 These values are clearly set out in the Su-
preme Court’s cases on hearsay. In Ohio v. Roberts176 the Court ex-
plained that the Confrontation Clause allows for the admission of an
out-of-court statement by an unavailable declarant only if the state-
172. Paul C. Giannelli, Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV.
45, 62–63 (1993) (“Unfortunately, the Court failed to appreciate the problems associated with
applying [its Confrontation Clause] standard to experts. The cross-examination of an expert
‘poses a formidable task; it is the rare attorney who knows as much as the expert.’”) (quoting
United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 513 (D. Md. 1973)); Andrew Taslitz, Catharsis, the
Confrontation Clause, and Expert Testimony, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 103, 120 (1993) (“[L]awyers
will be ill-equipped even to bring procedural flaws to a jury’s attention absent extensive discov-
ery that is often not available . . . .”).
173. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE , supra note 112, at 66 (“The need for full and fair
disclosure is especially apparent with respect to scientific proof and the testimony of experts.
This sort of evidence is practically impossible for the adversary to test or rebut at trial without
an advance opportunity to examine it closely.”).
174. Giannelli, supra note 172, at 63 (quoting Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities
of the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989)). Lucas is the
director of The Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor General, Toronto, On-
tario. Lucas, supra, at 719 n.1.
175. Taslitz, supra note 172, at 122. Professor Taslitz also describes two other values of Con-
frontation Clause case law that would be promoted by increased discovery: (1) controlling gov-
ernment misconduct and (2) furthering catharsis, the process by which parties “vent their feel-
ings before a group of average citizens who will understand the justice of the parties’ position,”
and the community is assured that “order prevails and that justice is being done.” Id. at 122, 126.
176. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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ment contains “indicia of reliability.”177 The Roberts Court also held
that the Confrontation Clause is concerned with “‘afford[ing] the trier
of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment.’”178 The Court summed up its concern with both the reliability
of the evidence presented and the jury’s ability to evaluate that evi-
dence in Greene v. McElroy: “[T]he evidence used to prove the Gov-
ernment’s case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an
opportunity to show that it is untrue.”179
Would the values described above be served by allowing defen-
dants discovery of data underlying DNA kit results? Access to devel-
opmental data and primer sequences allows defendants to challenge
the reliability of the kit results by, among other things: (1) question-
ing whether the kits were validated appropriately, (2) showing that
the kits are prone to certain types of errors, and (3) looking for the
effects of contamination in the PCR process.180 Moreover, the defense
would be able to provide the jury with more information on the qual-
ity of the DNA evidence provided to it, thus enhancing the factfind-
ing process.
C. Due Process
The constitutional clause most frequently discussed by courts in
evaluating defense subpoenas for information held by private corpo-
rations is the Due Process Clause. In State v. Pfenning,181 for example,
the trial court excluded the results of PowerPlex, Profiler Plus, and
Cofiler where neither the defense nor the scientific community at
large had access to validation data, stating “the manufacturer’s pro-
prietary concerns . . . can not [sic] trump Defendant’s right to a fair
trial.”182 Other trial courts have disagreed with the Pfenning court,
holding that lack of access to the data does not raise any due process
177. Id. at 66 (“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that [the declarant] is unavailable.
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’”); see also
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigor-
ous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”).
178. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
179. 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959).
180. See supra Part I.
181. No. 57-4-96 (Vt. Dist. Ct. Apr. 6, 2000).
182. Id., slip op. at 52.
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issues. In State v. Dishmon,183 the trial court found that PE’s refusal to
divulge primer sequences and developmental validation data did not
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights because the defendant
“suffer[ed] no known harm by not having it.”184 In so holding, the
Dishmon court and others misunderstood the contours of the Due
Process Clause.
In Brady v. Maryland,185 the Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the prosecu-
tor to disclose evidence where the evidence is favorable to the defen-
dant and “material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”186
On first glance, Brady may appear to provide for a prosecutorial
duty to disclose relevant evidence only where it is in the prosecutor’s
possession; that is, Brady seems not to apply to information held by
third parties. However, in Kyles v. Whitley,187 the Supreme Court re-
versed a capital murder conviction for failure to disclose evidence
even though that evidence was not in the possession of the prosecu-
tor.188 The exculpatory evidence in question in Kyles was in the pos-
session of the police. Instead of simply extending the Brady guarantee
of disclosure to include information held by police officers, the Court
went further:
[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evi-
dence known to the others acting on the government’s behalf in the
case, including the police. But whether the prosecutor succeeds or
fails in meeting this obligation (whether, that is, a failure to disclose
is in good faith or bad faith), the prosecution’s responsibility for
failing to disclose known, favorable evidence rising to a material
level of importance is inescapable.189
Under Kyles, the first question of a Brady analysis becomes: is the
holder of the information requested by the defense “acting on the
government’s behalf in the case?”
183. Nos. 99047345, 99069306, 99079650 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Mar. 3, 2000).
184. Id., slip op. at 15.
185. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
186. Id. at 87.
187. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
188. Id. at 438.
189. Id. at 437–38 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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The question cannot be answered without a brief review of the
history of development of DNA kits. When Congress authorized the
creation of a National DNA Database in 1994, the FBI felt that the
DNA testing methods then available were not sufficiently sophisti-
cated to form the basis of a national standard.190 Dr. Budowle, the di-
rector of the Forensic Science Research and Training Center at the
FBI Academy, has testified that he believed a multiplex PCR-based
system would be the best system for national use.191 In 1994, the only
multiplex systems available were triplex systems that he found to be
inadequate.192 As a result, he decided to find a manufacturer that was
willing to work with the FBI to develop a more complex multiplex
system than those in existence at the time.193 He felt only two compa-
nies were capable of developing an appropriate DNA typing system:
PE and Promega.194 Dr. Budowle chose to talk to PE first because the
FBI and PE had worked together in the past, and PE kits already
were used by the FBI and other state crime laboratories.195
PE and the FBI together developed the new system over several
years and through several phases.196 The first step required the devel-
opment of the primer sequences to be used in PCR.197 The second and
third steps involved developmental and forensic validation.198 During
these stages, PE worked closely with the FBI and a group of laborato-
ries chosen by Dr. Budowle.199 The laboratories tested early versions
of the multiplex kit and reported the results of those tests to PE.200 In
190. People v. Shreck, No. 98CR2475, slip op. at 13 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2000), available at http://
www.scientific.org/distribution/archive/Shreck.doc (on file with the Duke Law Journal), vacated
by 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001).
191. Id. Multiplexing uses PCR to duplicate more than one area of interest at a time. A dif-
ferent set of primers is used for each DNA segment to be duplicated. Multiplexing is signifi-
cantly superior to monoplex STR systems. First, when thirteen loci are used, as in the test even-
tually developed by PE, the discriminatory power of the test equals that of a method using four
or more RFLP loci. Dishmon, slip op. at 15. Second, the test can be completed in as little as
three days, compared to three weeks for RFLP testing. Id.
192. Shreck, slip op. at 13.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
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1998, the results of the collaboration, the Profiler Plus and Cofiler
kits, went on the market.201
Any claim that PE developed its multiplex kits in an entirely pri-
vate sphere, independent of government involvement, is disproved by
the history of its development. The government, in the form of FBI
scientist Dr. Budowle, both suggested the form that the kits should
take and participated extensively in their development. Nonetheless,
this history does not entirely support a finding that the kit makers
work “on behalf of the government.” Undoubtedly PE acted on its
own behalf as well. Moreover, other kit makers, such as Promega,
may have no such ties to the government.
As a result, it is imperative to consider the role of the kit makers
in the larger context of their role in the criminal justice system. Under
state action law, it is clear that “when private individuals or groups
are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in
nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State.”202
Under this rule, private individuals or corporations become agencies
or instrumentalities of the state if they run elections,203 manage a
company town,204 or maintain a municipal park.205 In the 1970s, the
Court narrowed the class of private entities considered agencies of
the government to those that exercise powers traditionally and exclu-
sively reserved to the government.206
Even under this narrowed test, the performance of scientific
testing in the course of police investigation is an activity traditionally
and exclusively reserved to the government. No area is more firmly
within the exclusive and traditional sphere of activity of the state than
201. Id.
202. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
203. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 466 (1953) (holding that private entities could not
run primary elections so as to exclude African Americans from participating); Smith v. All-
wright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944) (holding that a political party cannot exclude on the basis of
race); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) (noting that a political party acts as the state’s
delegate in running elections).
204. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (preventing the owner of a company town
from infringing upon the First Amendment rights of leafleteers).
205. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (preventing a golf course owned and op-
erated by a municipal government from discriminating on the basis of race).
206. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158–62 (1978) (finding that the “settle-
ment of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public func-
tion”); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351–52 (1974) (holding that utility compa-
nies are not subject to the public functions doctrine because traditionally the services they
provide have not been provided exclusively by the state).
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law enforcement.207 West v. Atkins,208 a case involving prisons, is par-
ticularly instructive. In West, the Court held that a private physician
under contract with North Carolina to provide medical services at a
state prison hospital on a part-time basis was a state actor.209 The
Court noted that because provision of medical care to prisoners was
fundamentally a governmental activity, the provider of that care is a
state actor.210 Moreover, this analysis is not altered by the fact that re-
spondent was paid by contract and was not on the state payroll, nor
by the fact that respondent was not required to work exclusively for
the prison.211
Like the prison hospital, the crime laboratory analyzing evidence
in the course of a criminal investigation is performing a law enforce-
ment function exclusively associated with the government. Corpora-
tions that work hand in hand with those laboratories by providing the
technology and know-how to perform DNA testing are, like the doc-
tor in West, performing a fundamentally governmental “function
within the state system.”212 As a result, those corporations must be
considered to be “acting on the government’s behalf in the case”
within the meaning of Brady.213
Aside from the historical and state action arguments, it is worth
noting that several lower courts implicitly have found that private
corporations act on behalf of the government when they perform
DNA testing on behalf of law enforcement. For example, in People v.
207. The Supreme Court has recognized the prominence of the government’s role in judicial
processes generally, commenting that “[f]ew places are a more real expression of the constitu-
tional authority of the government than a courtroom, where the law itself unfolds. Within the
courtroom, the government invokes its laws to determine the rights of those who stand before
it.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). Thus, private actors using
courtroom procedures, such as jury selection, may not discriminate on the basis of race in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
208. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
209. 487 U.S. at 54. However, actors within the judicial system are not considered state ac-
tors where their relationship with the government is “adversarial.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981) (holding that public defenders are not state actors while representing
criminal defendants because the relation between the defender and the government is adver-
sarial in nature). In the case of private kit makers and forensic laboratories, the relationship is
entirely commercial. The laboratories buy their equipment from the kit makers. As a result, the
relationship between the two is not best described as “adversarial.”
210. Id.
211. Id. at 56–57.
212. Id. at 55.
213. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995).
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Davis,214 a conviction was reversed because Lifecodes, a private labo-
ratory, refused to disclose statistical standards used in determining
the probability of a “match.”215 The court described the evidence as
“‘material either to guilt or punishment’” and cited to Brady.216 The
court then held:
“The rule is plain that where the prosecution is permitted to call a
witness, expert or not, who testifies as to a fact in issue or a conclu-
sion to be drawn, the defendant is entitled to examine the underly-
ing data, the basis for the testimony” or else the defendant suffers
undue prejudice.217
The Minnesota Supreme Court also has held that due process
rights are implicated where information relating to testing is not re-
vealed by private laboratories.218 Although these cases differ from the
main concern of this Note—information underlying kits made by pri-
vate corporations but used by state and other laboratories—they
demonstrate the degree to which forensic DNA testing is considered
government activity.
Given the historical and state action arguments suggesting that
kit makers are acting on behalf of the government, what is the prose-
cution’s duty with respect to Brady evidence held by them? In Kyles
v. Whitley,219 the Court framed the prosecutor’s duty in the following
terms:
[N]o one doubts that police investigators sometimes fail to inform a
prosecutor of all they know. But neither is there any serious doubt
that “procedures and regulations can be established to carry [the
prosecutor’s] burden and to insure communication of all relevant in-
formation on each case to every lawyer who deals with it.”220
The Supreme Court thus insisted that the prosecutor “establish regu-
lations and procedures” for obtaining information from other law en-
forcement agencies, which, as was established above, should be un-
214. 601 N.Y.S.2d 174 (App. Div. 1993).
215. Id. at 175.
216. Id. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
217. Id. (citations omitted).
218. State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) (“The fair trial and due process
rights are implicated when data relied upon by a laboratory in performing tests are not available
to the opposing party for review and cross examination.”).
219. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
220. Id. at 438 (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
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derstood to include private forensic technology companies that par-
ticipate in testing.221
But the Supreme Court seemed to say more than that the prose-
cutor has a duty to search for the relevant information; the Supreme
Court assumed that these regulations and procedures would enable
the prosecutor to discover the information.222 As a result, the Supreme
Court created no room for failure. The core inquiry made by a Court
hearing a Brady claim does not relate to the prosecutor’s conduct; it
relates to the “character of the evidence that [the prosecutor] has
withheld.”223
What “character” defines Brady evidence? Evidence must be
disclosed under Brady where it is “material either to guilt or punish-
ment.” The Supreme Court has identified two concerns underlying
materiality of evidence: whether the evidence could have changed the
outcome of the trial, and whether the court could make an accurate
and fair ruling without the evidence.
The Court described the first concern in United States v. Bag-
ley,224 where it wrote that “evidence is material only if there is a rea-
sonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the de-
fense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘rea-
sonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.”225 Where information sought by the de-
221. See United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prose-
cutor is obliged to search prison, probation, and parole files); United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d
1500, 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (describing the prosecution’s duty to search for evidence even when
that evidence is “in the possession of agencies other than the prosecutor’s office”). In Brooks,
the court noted that “[t]he cases finding a duty to search have involved files maintained by
branches of government ‘closely aligned with the prosecution.’” Id. at 1503 (quoting United
States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir. 1985)).
222. For an argument that prosecutors are not able to secure all relevant information from
other law enforcement agencies, see Stanley Z. Fischer, The Prosecutor’s Ethical Duty to Seek
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379,
1415–16 (2000) (arguing that the American system should take lessons from the English system,
which provides for a comprehensive regulatory framework for police recordkeeping and revela-
tion of case information to the prosecutor).
223. Brown v. French, 147 F.3d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the reason for failure
to disclose is insignificant where the evidence sought was not favorable to the defendant, be-
cause the character of the evidence is the primary consideration in establishing a Brady viola-
tion).
224. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
225. Id. at 682. Earlier cases held that the degree of materiality required depended on the
specificity of the disclosure request. Id. at 681. The specificity of the requests was divided into
three categories: specific requests, general requests, and no requests. Id. at 682. In Bagley, the
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fense could result in evidence against the defendant being ruled in-
admissible, that information usually will have “a reasonable prob-
ability” of altering the outcome of the case. In United States v. Yee,226
the district court addressed the materiality of data that challenges the
admissibility of DNA evidence:
If [defendants] prevail in their challenge to the government’s proffer
of that evidence, the likelihood of conviction will be diminished sub-
stantially, if not eliminated. The opportunity for the defendants to
make an effective challenge, and, more importantly, the ability of
this court to resolve the issue of admissibility fairly, depend on pre-
hearing access by defense counsel and their experts to the materials
that are the subject of their discovery request.227
Although the probability that the exclusion of DNA evidence would
have changed the course of the trial will vary from case to case, there
are certainly many cases in which the prosecution relies heavily on
DNA evidence. In most cases in which the evidence is present, it
forms a strong part of the prosecution’s case-in-chief. As a result, in-
formation that bears upon the admissibility of that evidence must be
considered capable of altering the outcome of the trial.
The Yee court also referred to the second concern underlying the
materiality requirement: the ability of courts to find the truth. The
Court’s most recent word on the subject came in Kyles v. Whitley,228
where the Court emphasized, “The question is not whether the de-
fendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict
with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”229
The possibility of a fair trial is certainly reduced where information
related to the value of scientific evidence is withheld from the de-
fense. In its order granting discovery to the defense, the Yee court
wrote, “The precondition to reaching a correct decision concerning
the admissibility of the DNA evidence in this case is . . . a record that
is as complete and clear as is reasonably possible.”230 Where creating a
Court established that one standard of materiality would apply to all disclosure requests, as well
as failures to request. Id. at 682–83.
226. 129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
227. Id. at 636.
228. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
229. Id. at 434.
230. 129 F.R.D. at 631.
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complete and clear record requires the prosecution to provide evi-
dence in the possession of law enforcement, under Brady the prosecu-
tion must do so.
Finally, requiring the prosecutor to obtain this information from
the sellers of the kits serves the fundamental goal of due process: en-
suring a fair trial. Requiring disclosure is the only way to ensure that
private corporations do not play too great a role in the administration
of justice. In Kyles the Court wrote: “any argument for excusing a
prosecutor from disclosing what he does not happen to know about
boils down to a plea to substitute the police for the prosecutor, and
even for the courts themselves, as the final arbiters of the govern-
ment’s obligation to ensure fair trials.”231 The role of the courts as the
arbiters of the government’s obligation to ensure fair trials is equally
imperiled by private corporations.
CONCLUSION
As scientific evidence becomes more prominent in the court-
room, subpoenas to corporations in possession of scientific informa-
tion are likely to issue with greater frequency. This conflict promises
especially grave consequences in the area of criminal prosecutions,
where science may be used to secure a sentence of imprisonment or
death. Although courts desire to preserve a space for innovation in
forensic and other sciences likely to increase the efficacy of the crimi-
nal justice system, this need must be balanced against the rights of de-
fendants to challenge scientific evidence against them. In the end, the
intellectual property rights of corporations must give way to the con-
stitutional rights of the accused.
231. 514 U.S. at 438.
